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FIGHTING FOR ACCEPTANCE 
Geoffrey W. Jensen 
(Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Prescott, Arizona) 
War is a driving force of history. Even in cases where the change that occurred was less than 
desirable or frankly even wanted. Throughout the twentieth century, the captains of this particular 
industry were state-based militaries. Akin to any other type of endeavor, those plying the trade of 
conflict have not then, or one suspects even now, agreed with how to go about carrying out change. 
The alteration of a society could take many forms: from the upheaval of a government and its 
military to the establishment of a new, or relatively different, one; the releasing of occupied 
territories dominated by a foreign entity or the transitioning to another foreign overseer; the 
potential uplifting or enslaving of an oppressed group or minority of a foreign or indigenous 
population, let alone the enslaving of an entire population; and the planning and ultimate carrying 
out of the rebuilding of a war-torn society by those who occupy it. Traditional military historians, 
from John Keegan to James McPherson have contended with these issues and others admirably. 
And as such, they will not be rehashed here. 
As a War and Society historian, I am interested in the stories of minority groups and how their 
treatment and status as citizens changed before, during, and after a conflict. My current research 
examines how African American civil rights leaders cajoled-often doing so by relying on a strategy 
that required their race to cudgel a foreign enemy of the United States as proof of their loyalty, 
patriotism, and abilities-the Caucasian majority of the republic into treating them as societal 
equals. And consequently, how the socially conservative American military establishment played 
a reluctant role in carrying out progressive change for its black soldiers during the Second World 
War and beyond.  
 
 
 
The Revenge of the South and the Reticence of the American military 
The first thing to note is that the American military establishment of the 1940s was not inclined to 
change the status quo of white over black that dominated throughout the republic, albeit, most 
notoriously and viciously in the American South. In this sense, they displayed an unwillingness to 
break with a tradition that had been largely established and reinforced perennially with every 
American war since the end of the Civil War. Indeed, Reconstruction, the end result of four bloody 
years of civil war, turned the southern white world upside down. Former slaves were now free, 
and, in some cases, politically powerful, while Carpetbagging northerners invaded Dixie in what 
southerners believed was a calculated attempt to fleece the post-war carcass of the south. By 1877, 
however, what southerners considered to be a nightmare ended. Northern white Republicans, 
whether racially progressive or not, ended Reconstruction. As one nightmare ended, another fueled 
by revenge-oriented southern whites that sought to avenge their defeat during the Civil War and 
to restore the racial balance, began.  
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Wielding the power of their state governments as if it were a whip, white southerners cracked 
away at the recently acquired rights of the Freedmen. They were no fools, though; whites purloined 
the rights of blacks in a fashion that sought to avoid triggering questions about violating the 
Constitution, specifically, the Reconstruction Amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th). Through devices 
such as poll taxes, literacy requirements, and the white primary, white southerners disfranchised 
and snuffed out the political power of black voters and ushered in the era of Jim Crow segregation. 
Their efforts even sought to challenge the maxim «that the winners write the history» as they 
carefully crafted a fictious pro-south version of the events of slavery, the Civil War, and beyond 
known as «The Lost Cause» narrative. By 1896, southern segregationists received the backing of 
the Supreme Court as it upheld racial segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson. From this landmark case, 
the dubious phrase «separate but equal» was introduced into the debate over the segregation of the 
races. In theory, if the facilities of whites and blacks, whether they were drinking fountains or 
schools, were equal in quality, they could and would remain separate. The problem, however, was 
that Plessy was a legal attempt to define the matter, not a moral one. Moreover, in the New South, 
the facilities never matched the promise of the ruling, either. Instead, it reinforced physically the 
notion of blacks as second-class citizens. When segregation proved not enough to curtail the 
ambitions of African Americans, white southerners turned to the old stand-by of racial violence. 
For a decade, 1880 to 1890, the lynching of blacks increased dramatically5642. 
At the nexus of this militant behavior towards the black population were white male concerns 
over societal standing and the various ways it could be challenged. Of these, the one that proved 
to inspire the most visceral of responses was interracial sex. Throughout American slavery, white 
southern men had sexual relationships, whether wanted or unwanted, with black women; instead 
of abandoning this activity, white men went underground about their sexual escapades. Their 
concern, however, was not on their own sexual promiscuity or the pleasure they derived from it, 
but that of sexual liaisons between white women and black men. It is fair to say that most southern 
whites held a base concern about the intermixing of their race or the alleged «mongrelization» of 
it. But that fear was still wed to the greater issue of loss of status. White men of wealth and privilege 
feared interracial sex between a black man and a white woman because it threatened their stature 
in southern society’s hierarchy. For a different reason, poor whites also worried about the class 
ramifications and fallout of sexual activity between the races. Interracial sex or even the hint of 
sexual promiscuity between a black man and white women threatened their place just above 
African Americans in the social pecking order5643. 
The greatest beneficiaries of this bounty of consternation over interracial sex were white 
southern democratic politicians, who recognized the promise of plowing political fields lined with 
white fears over black ascendency. Responding to the outcry of their constituents, southern white 
politicians pushed for further exclusion of blacks in their region and beyond; this included 
participation in the American military. At the state level, southern politicians largely succeeded in 
prohibited African American service in state militias-a victory that remained in place all the way 
through the Vietnam War. Emboldened by their triumphs at the state level, they also targeted black 
enlistment in the United States Army with a few unsuccessfully attempting to remove black 
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soldiers from the ranks completely. Though their efforts failed, the War Department got the 
message. The American Armed Forces had counted a sizeable contingent of southerners within its 
ranks. With such a large population of soldiers along with the existence of several military 
installations in the region, the military leadership of the armed forces opted to proceed in a 
distinctly southern fashion when it came to matters of race. Within this conservative and racist 
milieu, and despite their notable historical service to the nation, African American soldiers 
remained segregated from whites in four all-black combat regiments-collectively, these men 
became known as the Buffalo Soldiers5644. 
Throughout the early twentieth century, white racist military commanders presented many 
justifications for the continued segregation of troops. Often, the basis of their arguments against 
racial integration focused on the reliance upon negative racial stereotypes that originated with 
slavery and ballyhooed in the years after Reconstruction to return free blacks to a position 
subservient to white Americans. Many contended that blacks were too violent and unruly to lead; 
at other times, conversely, some commanders considered them too lazy, cowardly, and generally, 
child-like in their intellect to be effective warriors for the republic. Over time, these highly flawed 
opinions based steeped in the racist ideology of the old south received the backing of equally 
questionable quasi-scientific studies. When old ideas and questionable science were not enough, 
white commanders suggested that there was too much water under the bridge between the two 
races to allow them to co-exist in an integrated setting. They based their argument partially on the 
concept of maturity-a point that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, when probed on the matter years 
later, also believed prevented the successful integration of the armed forces. The past of slavery 
notwithstanding, by maturity, they meant that the races had not evolved to the point where they 
could get along sufficiently enough to function in a cohesive manner. White military leaders were 
convinced that blacks and whites, if housed within the same unit, would fall into bickering and 
fighting. The last thing the armed forces hierarchy or a commander of a unit on the ground wanted 
was anarchy amongst their troops. If the races could not coexist, then the effectiveness of the unit, 
whether it was a support unit or a combat unit, would falter5645. 
Regardless of the white racism that instigated both situations, two incidents in Texas reinforced 
white commanders’ fears of degrading the ranks by way of the intermixing of the races. In 1906, 
according to white accounts, unprovoked black soldiers stationed in Brownsville, Texas had 
allegedly opened fire on citizens of the town. Relying on questionable evidence and racial 
stereotyping, President Theodore Roosevelt discharged all the men of 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry 
Regiment. Eleven years later, in 1917, African American soldiers again met face to face with 
racism in Texas, this time in Houston. In retaliation for the unprovoked beating of two black 
soldiers, about a hundred men from 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry launched an assault on the city. In 
the wake of the violence, sixteen whites and twenty-three blacks were killed5646. 
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The concerns of racial animosity and efficiency congealed to create a powerful argument 
against integration. But there was something else. Army leadership, along with the rest of the 
armed forces, believed that it was not their place to challenge the laws and social norms of society. 
This included the American South and its steady embrace of Jim Crow segregation. To act in such 
manner, they believed, deviated away from the primary purpose of the military, which was the 
defense of the nation. Worse, it would place it firmly in the crosshairs of the segregated American 
South and draw the ire of powerful southern politicians in Washington who not only represented 
Jim Crow segregation, but also controlled the military’s purse strings5647. 
This begs the question, though, if white America did not want them, why did it continue to 
acquiesce to demands to include them within the ranks? Why continue to fall back on a minority 
group whose population amounted to around 10-12% of the American population? As historian 
David Brion Davis observed, white America in this tale of racial disharmony continued to find 
itself a slave to «the doctrine of necessity». Repeatedly, it became apparent to the white American 
majority that if they were to win the cause they were currently engaged in that they had better 
employ the services of black men to don the uniforms of the armies of the republic-but not always 
for the sole purpose of fighting. Put another way, each war, in its own way, required an all available 
hands on deck approach to defeating whatever bane the nation faced. From waging war against 
English Tyranny to Vietnamese Communism and everything in-between, the white community, 
whether it wanted it or not, needed the African American community5648. 
The call for African American involvement in the armed forces emanated from black America, 
however, not white America. From the Revolution onward, a voice, sometimes a chorus, rang out 
calling for black inclusion in the fight. For instance, without the timely writings, social and 
political activism, and continuous prodding of Frederick Douglass, along of course with the 
necessity of the moment, the black man would have struggled to affix «an eagle on his button…», 
or for that matter, a «musket on his shoulder and bullets in his pocket…» during the Civil War. 
That is not to say it would not have happened without his involvement as there were those white 
Union commanders and politicians during the brutal struggle that were sympathetic to the enlisting 
of free and enslaved black men if for no other reason to win the war. Douglass mattered because 
he was black and understood and articulated repeatedly the social injustices and indignities of the 
African American community in such a fashion that captured the hearts and minds of both black 
and white to the cause of equality. His work mattered historically as it helped wed black service 
to the prospect of earning racial equality through combat service. And Douglass did so knowing 
full well that many whites in the Union did not want his or his races help. This, in of itself, was 
another trend that began. From Douglass onward, black leaders repeatedly proved willing to enter 
a Faustian bargain with whites to include their race in the fight and did so by dangerously clinging 
to the notion that their race’s sacrifice was meritorious enough to earn a metaphorical badge of 
honor that proved their worthiness as societal equals5649. 
There were other reasons for service to the country to be sure. The black community believed 
that service in the military offered them a chance to partially escape the woes of segregation-a 
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continuing belief that lasted until the Vietnam War, when a younger generation of African 
American soldiers reared during the Civil rights movement questioned many of the remnants of 
racism in the American Armed Forces and the society it served to protect5650. In spite of its 
remaining flaws, a career in the military potentially offered a greater opportunity for upward 
mobility, many African American personnel believed, than they could achieve in the civilian 
world. Equally important, the military did not discriminate in pay. Questions over whether 
promotion was always equally achieved between the races aside, a white private and a black 
private in the Army made the same amount of money. Progressive benefits that came with the 
overall reform of the military throughout the twentieth century, such as dependent health care and 
education for a soldier’s children, even if segregated (though with the reform of the military this, 
too, changed), sweetened the deal for black soldiers as well. A life in the military also provided 
African American men with a sense of accomplishment. The opportunity to defend their nation 
and to live in a fashion that was superior to the majority of their race instilled great pride in these 
men and their families. Congealing all of this together was their patriotism. African American 
citizens, despite the racism and bigotry they faced, genuinely felt tied to a nation that they had 
helped to create. In turn, the black community viewed their black soldiers with great admiration 
and held them in high regard. «We Negroes had little, at the turn of the century, to help sustain our 
faith in ourselves except the pride that we took in the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, the Twenty-fourth 
and Twenty-fifth Infantry,» historian Rayford Logan observed. And though the results often failed 
to satisfy the weight of the obligation on the African American community, it was, as historians 
Jeffrey T. Sammons and John H. Morrow, Jr. wryly put it, a matter of being «damned if you do 
and damned if you don’t». Essentially, what else could African Americans have done but embrace 
the historical motif, one that was deeply engrained in the lexicon of the republic, of war as a 
motivator for change?5651 
 
 
 
World War I 
As with other American conflicts, the right to fight in World War I was a long, grueling and 
bitingly unfair, slog for the nation’s blacks. And though there were those who openly, as others of 
their race had done throughout American history, questioned involvement in a war that they likely 
would receive little in return for, their concerns were drowned out by the larger clamoring for 
involvement. The head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples 
(NAACP), W.E.B. Du Bois, viewed the tumultuous war unfolding in Europe as an opportunity for 
the African American community to prove their mettle in combat. It was, therefore, time to «Close 
Ranks» and do battle with a common enemy: 
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That which the German power represents today spells death to the aspirations of Negroes and 
darker races for equality, freedom and democracy. Let us not hesitate. Let us, while the war 
lasts, forget our special grievances and close our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our white 
fellow citizens and the allied nations that are fighting for democracy. 
DuBois effectively linked the cause of the African American community, namely, civil rights 
reform, to President Woodrow Wilson’s belief that «The World must be made safe for 
Democracy». Still, there was more to this call to action for Du Bois than grasping at the brass ring 
of equality. About a decade prior to the Great War, he had also called upon «The Talented Tenth» 
of his race to rise and lead: 
The Negro race, like all races, is going to be saved by its exceptional men. The problem of 
education, then, among Negroes must first of all deal with the Talented Tenth; it is the problem 
of developing the Best of this race that they may guide the Mass away from the contamination 
and death of the Worst, in their own and other races. 
This call was not limited to domestic issues. It was clear that he intended the elite of his race to 
be involved in the crucible of European combat to demonstrate themselves as worthy equals to 
whites by defeating a common threat, while also serving as role models for the rest of the African 
American community5652. 
Under the stipulations of the Selective Service Act of 1917, 367,000 black soldiers were 
inducted into the military; however, the racism present within turn of the century American society 
largely prevented most from serving in combat for their country. As a result, ninety percent of 
African American soldiers in the Army during the Great War served in support units; therefore, 
they fought to make the world safe for democracy in the motor pool, in ammo and supply depots, 
or as cooks. Those that did serve in combat largely did so under the auspices of the Ninety-Second 
Division, which remained attached to the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), and the Ninety-
Third Division, a collective of all-black National Guard units dispatched to the French. The latter 
was a cause of particular concern for the AEF leadership; so much so, that a French attaché, Col. 
Louis Linard, issued a directive to his fellow countrymen delineating the difference between 
French treatment of their colonial African forces and how that clashed with white America’s views 
on black America. He bluntly observed: «They [white America] are afraid that contact with the 
French will inspire in black Americans aspirations which to them (the whites) appear intolerable. 
It is of the utmost importance that every effort be made to avoid profoundly estranging American 
opinion.» According to Linard, the black man was a citizen by law, but largely viewed by whites 
«as an inferior being with whom relations of business or service only are possible». Importantly, 
white American males viewed him as a sexual savage of sorts: 
The vices of the Negro are a constant menace to the American who has to repress them sternly. 
For instance, the black American troops in France have, by themselves, given rise to as many 
complaints for attempted rape as all the rest of the army. And yet the (black American) soldiers 
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sent us have been the choicest with respect to physique and morals, for the number disqualified 
at the time of mobilization was enormous. 
Though the alleged «vices» of black soldiers proved to be unfounded and untrue, they serve as 
a reminder of the staying power that racist ideology hailing from the peculiar institution of slavery 
had on the Americans and as a by-product of the war, her allies. In order to maintain American 
support, French commanders were strongly encouraged to follow three courses of action when it 
came to African American personnel: 
1. We must prevent the rise of any pronounced degree of intimacy between French officers 
and black officers. We may be courteous and amiable with these last, but we cannot deal 
with them on the same plane as with white American officers without deeply offending 
the latter. We must not eat with them, must not shake hands or seek to talk or meet with 
them outside the requirements of military service.  
2. We must not commend too highly the black American troops, particularly in the presence 
of (white) Americans. It is all right to recognize their good qualities and their services, 
but only in moderate terms strictly in keeping with the truth. 
3. Make a point of keeping the native cantonment population from «spoiling» the Negroes. 
(White) Americans become greatly incensed at any public expression of intimacy 
between white women with black men. They have recently uttered violent protests against 
a picture in the «Vie Parisienne» entitled «The Child of the Desert» which shows a (white) 
woman in a «cabinet particulier» with a Negro. Familiarity on the part of white women 
with black men is furthermore a source of profound regret to our experienced colonials 
who see in it an overweening menace to the prestige of the white race. 
Though, the French were not above racism, their treatment of colonial forces was in stark 
contrast to that of the Americans and therefore, they were largely insulted by the suggestions on 
how to handle black American soldiers under their care. Their intransigence on the matter paid big 
dividends for them. For instance, the performance of the all-black Ninety-Third Division, 
composed of the 369th-372nd Divisions, proved exemplary as they received tremendous praise and 
military honors from their grateful French commanders who had taken the time to re-train and 
properly equip them5653. 
While black troops performed well under the auspices of the French, the same could not be said 
of the Ninety-Second Division, which remained under AEF control. Instead of exploring why one 
division succeed, while another faltered, racist white leadership of the AEF preferred to fall back 
on racial stereotypes and a good bit of scapegoating. During the Argonne offensive, the Ninety-
Second Division’s 368th Infantry Regiment fell into shambles. According to contemporary 
accounts, black soldiers of the troubled unit were cowardly malcontents that refused to engage the 
enemy. Modern historians have absolved the regiment of much of the blame as they discovered 
that the unit was ill-prepared for combat, lacked the proper equipment, let alone maps in some 
cases, and was led by questionable and racist white leadership. But in the post-Great War era, a 
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narrative of racial failure lived on and did so by making the Ninety-Second’s woes as prima facie 
evidence of the inability of black soldiers to fight5654. 
 
 
 
Building a powerful political base 
Throughout the early twentieth century, African Americans were on the move. During the Great 
Migration (1910-1940), an estimated two million black citizens abandoned the south for the urban 
factories of the north. The northern region of the United States served as a sort of American version 
of Canaan for them; a place where they believed they would be treated equally and fairly. In the 
north, however, black migrants encountered racism just as virulent if less sanctioned under law. 
Racist hiring practices, restrictions on their living in some neighborhoods, and segregation in 
northern schools prevented African Americans from fully realizing their dreams of freedom and 
equality. That said, they found their right to vote unimpaired. A fact not lost on the politicians of 
the early twentieth century as northern Democrats and Republicans both courted the urban black 
vote. Civil rights leaders, representing African American special interest groups, such as the 
NAACP and the National Urban League (NUL), also recognized the emerging power of the black 
vote in the north and harnessed it into a potent political weapon against racial segregation and 
prejudice. The black community also gained a measure of confidence in the power of the federal 
government by way of the New Deal. Though Rooseveltian policies failed to provide a panacea 
for all of black America’s societal ills, the existence of a progressive and active government gave 
them renewed hope in the American system. They were not naïve, though. African Americans 
knew all too well that southern segregationists occupying seats in the House and Senate could also 
use the government against the black community to further their region’s dogmatic embrace of 
Jim Crow5655. 
 
 
 
World War II 
On the precipice of World War II, African American civil rights leaders remained subscribed to 
the idea that American involvement in war provided their community with an opportunity to stake 
their claim for equal treatment. While they developed many varying strategies to enact reform in 
American society, none were as unique as their decision, made in the First World War, to entwine 
domestic racial problems with American idealism. Civil rights leaders, such as W.E.B. Dubois, 
used the longstanding American belief of American exceptionalism, the idea that the American 
nation was destined to play a special role in the world, against racist white America. Through the 
juxtaposition of American racism with its idealism, civil rights advocates illuminated the 
hypocrisy of the republic. Taken in full, criticisms by activists such as Mary White Ovington, co-
founder of the NAACP and James Weldon Johnson, a multi-talented and creative author, musician, 
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and educator can be summarized as follows: How could the United States fight a war against 
Fascism, Nazism, and Japanese imperialism, and thus, to make the world safe for democracy, when 
it denied those very rights that lay at the heart of a democratic society to a segment of its own 
population?5656 
In the spring of 1940, the NACCP held its annual conference in Philadelphia. During that 
meeting the various beliefs and strategies, whether the badge of honor philosophy or the hypocritic 
nature of the nation were on display as civil rights leaders continued to agitate for integration, in 
the military, but also society at large. Current events, however, also provided another cause for 
them to utilize: «Hitlerism.» The threat of an ultra-conservative and racist authoritarian leader in 
Germany was not lost on civil rights leaders or their constituents. In many ways, the rallying cry 
against «Hitlerism» was part of a larger narrative that included what Jesse Owens achieved in 
Germany as he ran circles around the competition in the 1936 Olympic games or what Joe Lewis 
proved with his stunning first round knockout of Max Schmeling in 1938 for the Heavyweight 
crown and that was that black lives, rights, and freedoms mattered5657. 
Going into the fall of 1940, service as combat soldiers remained an important issue to civil 
rights leaders, but so did ending racial segregation within the armed forces. Leading the effort to 
integrate the military was A. Phillip Randolph, the leader of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters. Randolph, along with contemporary civil rights leaders, Arnold Hill, and Walter White 
met with President Franklin Roosevelt in late September. While the president noted the 
achievements that had been made, namely a pledge of inclusion of blacks in all branches of the 
military, the civil rights contingent sought more. They encouraged him to end segregation in the 
entire American defense community overall-from the selection of military personnel at the local 
level by draft boards to improving opportunities throughout. FDR’s willingness to hear the men 
out caused a sense of hope that further changes could be in the works. The War Department, 
though, proved unwilling to budge much further than allowing blacks to serve in each branch-
predominately in supportive, or in the case of the Navy, subservient, careers such as the Steward’s 
Branch. To make matters worse, Steve Early, Roosevelt’s Press Secretary, released an erroneous 
statement that falsely claimed that Randolph, Hill, and White had supported the token reform of 
the War Department, and furthermore, believed in maintaining racial segregation in the military. 
After an onslaught of angry letters from black citizens and critical editorials from the African 
American press, the White House rescinded the statement. But the damage was already done. In 
the meantime, Randolph, who had had his fill of meetings, upped the ante. If Roosevelt would not 
come to terms with the black community on the issue, then Randolph was going to bring the 
community to the president. With over ten thousand African Americans at his side, he threatened 
to launch an all-black non-violent march on Washington under the banner of racial reform in the 
defense establishment5658. 
In this game of political chicken, Roosevelt, who counted on the support of urban black voters 
as part of his larger New Deal voting coalition, blinked first. Under the auspices of Executive 
Order 8802, the president prohibited discrimination, whether it was racial, religious, or ethnic, in 
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America’s wartime defense industry. Additionally, the executive order created the Fair 
Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) which was charged with investigating cases of 
discrimination within the work place. Out of an effort to restore black confidence in the 
administration, Roosevelt made further symbolic, though noteworthy, changes. The White House 
compelled the War Department to go forward with plans to establish a black flying squadron within 
the Army Air Corps. This all-black unit would ultimately be stationed and trained in Tuskegee, 
Alabama. The War Department also named an African American, Judge William Hastie, to be its 
first Negro Affairs adviser. The Army, which had never had a black general, received its first one 
when Benjamin O. Davis Sr. was promoted in 1940. As was expected, these maneuvers met with 
criticism in the south, notably the announcement of Davis’ promotion went over poorly in the 
region. «Are you crazy appointing a nigger as General in the U.S Army?», a West Virginian man 
disgustedly wondered5659. 
FDR largely pushed the issue for political reasons. His motivation for doing so, however, was 
not self-driven. Though, he understood to an extent the trials and tribulations of the African 
American community, he remained, to a fault, a practical political animal. It was about achieving 
as much as he could within the voting coalition he had netted together. After all, southern 
politicians in congress controlled the mechanisms of the state and could curtail his political agenda. 
This political reality emerges when examining many of FDR’s struggles with civil rights 
throughout his time in office. Instead of eradicating the specter of Judge Lynch, which was largely 
used to maintain the dominance of the white over black, FDR dodged the issue. When it came to 
the New Deal, Roosevelt’s progressive legislative program designed to uplift and reform American 
society during the Great Depression, it failed to offer much to the nation’s black population. The 
issue had to be brought to him in such a manner to force him to act. Still, though the civil rights 
leadership outside of the West Wing had done just that, they were not enough to get the president 
to move. Someone else had to apply pressure, daily, from within; one of his most trusted political 
confidants, his wife, Eleanor Roosevelt5660. 
Much like Franklin, Eleanor, was not without her own faults on the issue of race; her 
background was one of privilege and gentility, a way of life directly supported, by the presence of 
those from the lower classes that catered to her needs. Members of her family hailed from the 
American south, which aided in her early education in the societal gospel of white over black. 
However, much like her husband’s eventual successor, Harry S. Truman of Missouri, Eleanor 
evolved on the issue as she familiarized herself with the situation facing America’s blacks. The 
more willing she was to understand the injustices that they faced, the more determined Eleanor 
became to advocate for American blacks-from fundraising, to leaving the Daughters of the 
American Revolution, to having her picture taken with blacks visiting the White House and more. 
She became the principal ear and voice of the African American community within the White 
House. This all came with a political price, however, for the president as complaints emerged 
throughout the government-notably, the civilian chief of the War Department, Henry Stimson, 
loathed her involvement in the racial affairs of the military- to the American South. To an extent, 
Eleanor’s activities, including her infamous joy ride with a member of the Tuskegee Airmen, 
proved to be an effective scapegoating mechanism that allowed her critics in and outside the 
government to deflect criticism from themselves to the First Lady for the inclusion of blacks within 
                                                 
5659 Jonathan ROSENBERG: How Far…, pp. 139-140; Quoted in Doris KEARNS GOODWIN: No Ordinary…, pp. 
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the ranks. It was within this social and political milieu that the pejorative term «Eleanor 
Roosevelt’s Niggers» was born and remained affixed to her for the rest of her life. While members 
of American society bitterly complained about the matter for years to come, FDR handled it at the 
time in his own charming, if not sarcastic way, as he informed Eleanor: «You can say anything 
you want. I can always say, ‘Well, this is my wife; I can’t do anything about her’». And to the 
president’s credit, he never did5661. 
While the president acted for political, and perhaps, we can say out of respect to Eleanor’s 
prodding, personal reasons, the armed forces felt no desire or compulsion to go any further. To the 
leadership of the military, the continued drive for black inclusion was less about waging war 
against the republic’s enemies, instead, they viewed it as that of a political endeavor of an 
outspoken minority seeking improvement for their race-thus, they were effectively committing the 
unpatriotic, and thus, for some, moral, sin of putting their race’s needs over that of the rest of the 
country. In response, and in full harmony with the military’s reluctance to act, the Adjutant General 
of the Army, Col Eugene R. Householder, the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, stated 
explicitly: 
The Army is not a sociological laboratory; to be effective it must be organized and trained 
according to the principles which will insure success. Experiments to meet the wishes and 
demands of the champions of every race and creed for the solution of their problems are a danger 
to efficiency, discipline and morale and would result in ultimate defeat. 
The argument against becoming a sociological laboratory buttressed various aspects of white 
military leader’s concerns about becoming involved in racial matters; most importantly, their 
underlying concerns about military efficiency. If the Army, for example, bowed to political 
pressure from a group such as the NAACP to improve the situation facing black soldiers off-base 
in the American south, it would cause, they believed, irreparable damage between the Army and 
the local community, which likely would not support that change. This would affect recruiting, 
bases, and personnel in the region5662. 
Though weary to the role they would play and likely to the dismay of those whites in the military 
that did not want them, the African American community responded to the call to arms brought 
about by the attack on Pearl Harbor in an overwhelming fashion as over three million, the vast 
majority of which, 700,000, served in the Army, signed up for the chance to go to war for their 
country. The actions of civil rights leaders, the capitulation of Roosevelt, and the call from the 
African American press for a «Double V campaign» that defeated the Axis powers and racism in 
America had encouraged African Americans to register for war. Other factors, such as members 
of their community serving on selective service boards also played a role as fewer blacks were 
unfairly disqualified from military service-a problem that they had encountered in the past5663. 
Once in the fight, black soldiers discovered that they would play a greater role than their 
twentieth century predecessors. As with the Great War, African Americans served predominately 
in support units. But, the pressure tactics of civil rights advocates had paid off as some black 
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soldiers served in various combat roles, occupations, and all-black units. The most famous 
example, of course, was the Tuskegee Airmen. Led by Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., a West Point 
graduate and the son of the Army’s first black general, Benjamin O. Davis Sr., the Tuskegee 
Airmen carved out a reputation for African Americans in the skies. 
Often overshadowed by the awe inspiring-nature of the famed flyers were the African American 
armored personnel of the war. The most effective and famous of these units were the Black 
Panthers of the 761st All-Black Tank Battalion; a group of fighting men that had been dispatched 
to bolster General George S. Patton’s Third Army, amongst other groups, while making a name 
for themselves on the battlefield. Although «Old Blood and Guts» had shown concerns over the 
intellectual fighting abilities of African American soldiers, he embraced the black tankers as 
welcome allies against the greater threat of the Wehrmacht. During his first meeting with the 761st, 
the general, as he was often wont to do, got straight to the point: 
Men, you are the first Negro tankers to ever fight in the American army. I would never have 
asked for you if you weren’t good. I have nothing but the best in my army. I don’t care what 
color you are, so long as you go up there and kill the Kraut sonsofbitches. Everyone has their 
eyes on you, and is expecting great things of you. Most of all, your race is looking forward to 
your success. Don’t let them down, and, damn you, don’t let me down. They say it is patriotic 
to die for your country. Well, let’s see how many patriots we can make out of those German 
sonsofbitches5664. 
Interestingly, the men of the 761st, as they would do with Eleanor Roosevelt, ascribed a certain 
level of patronage to the famed general with the custom-made uniforms and ivory handled pistols; 
and did so, even after the war, despite Patton’s continued doubting of their abilities as fighters5665. 
The efforts of both, aside, the partial integration of black and white troops during the Battle of 
the Bulge was one the most critical events in recent African American military history. 
Unexpectedly, in 1945, Hitler launched a desperate counter-offensive against allied forces in 
western Europe. The counter-offensive had caught the Allies off guard. Short on men, and with 
the blessing of the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, General Eisenhower, the 
Army offered African Americans largely relegated to support roles the opportunity to fight side-
by-side with whites. Over four thousand volunteers later, African Americans fought in segregated 
all-black platoons that were situated next to all-white platoons. Together this quasi-integrated force 
repelled the German advance. Although they had fought well together, after the German threat was 
vanquished, segregation of forces resumed5666. 
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Conclusion 
From this overview of the African American community’s pursuit of military service leading up 
to the era of World War II several things can be gleaned. Though notable exceptions existed, the 
leadership of the armed forces did not actively seek out black volunteers. Part of the reason for 
their inclusion was the result of political pressure from civil rights leaders in and outside of black 
America. It was also the inevitable outcome brought about by the necessity of each military 
conflict. Once it was clear that blacks would serve, the next dilemma became how they would do 
so. White commanders alleged that a real threat to the functionality of the military-and to the social 
norms of white American society-could arise with black combat service. Let alone any attempt to 
racially integrate the ranks. This meant that the armed forces operated in a manner that was largely 
inefficient by creating essentially two forces: one white, one black and did so paradoxically in the 
name of efficiency5667. 
Despite white commanders, politicians, and personnel’s continued desire to not have to deal 
with black soldiers in the American Armed Forces, Civil rights leaders, from Douglass on, viewed 
black military service as a gateway to societal acceptance and elevation. Service in the armies of 
the republic, however, were not enough. African Americans need to fight, and in some cases, die 
to prove their race’s intellectual and physical mettle as combatants. Equally important, the very 
best of their race, Du Bois’ «Talented Tenth», had to lead their brethren on the battlefield; and by 
doing so, they would be able to lead their race off of it.  
African Americans were not alone in their fight for inclusion. Sympathetic progressive whites, 
at differing points, emerged as part of the driving force for change. During the Second World War, 
the most important was Eleanor Roosevelt. Her activities in support of black service during the 
war made the difference. As one of the principal political advisers, and partner, of the president, 
she had unprecedented access to the executive branch. This, along with appealing to the needs of 
an aspect of his political coalition, moved the needle with FDR enough for him to act.  
Once given the opportunity to fight, and to do so under supportive leadership that sought to 
train and command these men as equals, African Americans did not disappoint. For example, units 
such as the Buffalo Soldiers, the Ninety-Third Division, the Tuskegee Airmen, the 761st Tank 
Battalion, those who volunteered to repel the desperate gambit of the Nazis and aided in victory 
during the Battle of the Bulge, and others all performed beyond expectations.  
If there is a lesson to be learned from all this, especially in today’s era where the races once 
again are being pulled away from each other in America, but also internationally, by the forces of 
ignorance, fear and hatred, it is this. Though these moments matter in our understanding of the 
long history of African American military involvement, not a single one of these sacrifices led to 
the instant integration of the armed forces or an improvement in the treatment of their race. After 
the end of World War II, it would take another three years, further political agitation from white 
and black civil rights leaders, the tenacity of the 1948 presidential election, and the social 
maturation of the president, Harry S. Truman, before racial integration took hold. After that, it 
took several more decades to begin to address the various remnants of racism within the ranks. 
Indeed, it is an endeavor that continues to this day. 
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African American military service is not simply black history. It is more than the story of a race 
who repeatedly sacrificed themselves over the various epochs of American history for a nation 
that at best marginally appreciated their sacrifice, at worst, ignored it. Nor is it just one of many 
narratives emanating from the field of War and Society history about how war, or service in one 
of the armies doing battle, can change the fortunes of an individual or, in this case, a race. It is the 
story of human beings very basic need to be included as opposed to being apart. That togetherness 
in common concert for a cause-in this case, becoming societal equals with whites as American 
citizens-overshadowed what was really needed and desired all along. What really mattered, and 
has always mattered, for African Americans, or for that matter any other minority group that has 
sought willingly, and perhaps recklessly, to fight for a nation that habitually considers them 
unworthy or unequal, was not societal equality or equal treatment as citizens-though, minorities 
have had to settle for this-but instead acceptance as fellow human beings.  
